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Freedom to and Freedom from
Clare C. Hagan

There are different kinds of freedom. There are freedoms-to, such as the freedom to
protest, to express one’s self, and to act without constraint. But there are also beneficial
freedoms-from, such as freedom from injustice, freedom from discrimination, and freedom from
fear. Where freedoms-to always involve the right of the individual to act, freedoms-from involve
the right of an individual not to be acted upon. When one thinks of freedom in this manner, the
question, “If I cannot express my hatred, am I less free?” then becomes whether hate, or certain
types of hate, can rob people of enough freedoms-from—such as the freedom from oppression
and trepidation—to outweigh the right of an individual to express his or her hatred.
Ethical actions can never be considered in a vacuum. Although the question is “am I less
free?” other people are affected by the expression of my hate. I am not some special case: I am
an individual in society. The original purpose of expression is, after all, to communicate with
another, so others are necessarily involved. Because this action affects other people, it is useful
to consider Kant’s idea of a categorical imperative, the idea that one should “act only in
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a
universal law" (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 4:421). Then one must consider, if I
express my hatred are others less free? If others express their hatred, am I less free? Unless one
is to presume that “my hate” is somehow a special case, the correct question to ask is “If we, as
people, are not allowed to express our hate, are we less free?” This is an issue which must be
considered in the context of society.
When people come together in a society, individuals often choose to give up certain
freedoms-to in order to obtain beneficial freedoms-from. This may, at first, appear to be a given,
yet there are schools of thought such as anarchism and libertarianism that look on any constraint
or deprivation of freedoms-to as something negative; nevertheless, society for the most part, has

agreed to give up such things as the freedom to kill and steal without restraint in favor of the
freedom from being killed and freedom from having one’s possessions stolen. The triumph of
states and social contracts in today’s society reflects the general agreement that there is utility in
this idea of giving up a freedom-to-act in order to gain a more beneficial freedom-from-beingacted-upon. Through this seemingly paradoxical practice, a society is made freer through
constraint. With scant exceptions, this policy has endured wherever and whenever human beings
have gathered together in a society, from Hammurabi’s code on to today.
Although restricting the freedom to act in certain ways can be beneficial to a society and
make for freer citizens able to live with some measure of safety and security, should the freedom
to express hatred be counted among those which should be restricted? There are certain types of
hate, the expression of which promote beneficial freedoms-from rather than suppressing them.
Expressing hatred of injustice or poverty or systematic oppression can lead other voices to
declare their solidarity. Speaking out against problems is often the first step to finding a solution.
In this case, allowing someone to express his or her hatred would directly promote beneficial
freedoms-from, such as freedom from injustice, poverty, and systematic oppression in addition to
allowing that person the freedom-to express him or herself.
But not all hate is equal, and not all hate is directed at harmful problems in need of a
solution. Perhaps the most destructive form of hatred is that which is dehumanizing. An
expression of dehumanizing hatred can be extremely harmful, depriving its targets of very
necessary freedoms-from. Dehumanizing hate is that which denies the fundamental Truth of a
human being, the complexity within every person, and the human dignity owed to all. The
destructive potential of dehumanizing hatred is borne out in both fiction and in fact. One
example of dehumanization in literature is not even, technically, dehumanization, though it is a

stunning example of how using language which treats a living thing as an object can make that
living thing easier to harm. In The Handmaid’s Tale, two characters must kill their cat so it does
not attract attention after they flee their home. “I’ll take care of it, Luke said. And because he
said it instead of her, I knew he meant kill. That is what you have to do before you kill, I thought.
You have to create an it, where none was before. You do that first, in your head, and then you
make it real,” (Atwood 192). As this passage illustrates, treating a living thing as an object can
have pernicious consequences, especially when directed through expressions of hate. During the
Rwandan Genocide, the Hutu’s referred to the Tutsis as cockroaches. During the Holocaust, the
Nazis referred to the Jews as rats. The perpetrators of these genocides knew the same thing that
Margret Atwood’s character discovered. Dehumanizing expressions of hate can lead directly to
the ultimate act of dehumanization: to kill another person. When these expressions lead to the
deprivation of a person’s freedom-from unjust murder, the freedom-to express one’s
dehumanizing hate ultimately perpetuates less freedom in the world. The freedom gained in the
expression is nothing compared to the freedom which is lost.
There are different types of dehumanizing hatred, beyond the most obvious example of
language which refers to a person as an object or animal with the intention of making that person
appear less human. One example of this is prejudiced language. Hateful language based in
prejudice subordinates the characteristics of a person as an individual and affirms that he or she
is not, if fact, a distinct person: it only acknowledges that person as a member of a group.
Whenever someone says that “all people in ____ group are a certain way” it denies the variation
and complexity which is possible for the people in that group and it treats them instead as a
faceless, homogenous mass. It de-personalizes the members of that group, and when they are no
longer people, they are easier to attack. Someone would be much more likely to accuse an entire

group of a fault, such as dimwittedness, rather than to accuse every single individual person
within that group, face to face. When individuality within a group is denied, harmful expressions
of hate can seep into the consciousness of a society and things which are not true of individuals
within that group can affect them nevertheless. The consequences of racist and sexist ideas
perpetuated by hateful expressions in our society show that this can deprive people of their
freedom of individuality, as well as freedom from oppression and inequality. In the end,
expressions of hate—when paired with dehumanizing and prejudiced language—deprives people
of so many beneficial freedoms-from that the freedom-to express that hate shrinks small in
comparison. In these instances, an inability to express prejudiced hate does not make one less
free.
Another type of dehumanizing hatred is hatred which is directed at the whole of another
person. Wholly despicable people can only be found in the realms of fiction; true human beings
are far too complex, far too varied to be wholly good or wholly evil. When one directs his or her
hatred at the whole of a person, he or she must necessarily ignore the complexity inherent in
every human being. Not only does this type of hatred reduce the intricacy of another, exposing
them to the loss of freedom often found in the wake of dehumanizing hatred, but this brand of
malice also robs the person who acts upon it of his or her freedom-to the truth. To hate another
human flattens their true depth; one is hating—in effect—a lie one tells to one's self. This is also
a form of self-hatred, for when one hates another person, they direct their hate at a shared
fragment of common experience and common form inherent in all human beings—including the
one who hates. In the end, dehumanizing hatred is not only caustic for the ones at whom it is
directed; dehumanizing hatred is also harmful for the person who acts upon the impulse to hate
the totality of another human being. The person who hates the whole of another person not only

endanger another’s freedoms-from harm when they permit this especially vicious kind of hatred,
they also rob themselves of their own freedom-to empathy, clarity, and truth.
This discussion leaves several questions to be answered. Who can judge what hatred and
what language should be considered dehumanizing? Should deterrents be put in place? If so,
what should the punishment or penalty be? The issues these questions raise are complex and
highly problematic. For this reason, I want to be clear that I am not advocating for a system
which regulates hate speech. If people were appointed to decide which expressions of hate are
considered harmful, their choices could easily divide the list between the expressions which are
beneficial to the deciders verses the ones which criticize the deciders. If an expression of hate
were directed towards corrupt systems, it might be considered by the deciders to be harmful even
though it could be a beneficial warning to the society as a whole. The idea that certain
expressions of hate are harmful is better applied as a self-regulating idea than an idea to be
enforced by an easily corrupted system. I am not arguing in favor of the thought police. My
argument is simply that certain expressions of hate make us less free. It is true that there are
beneficial expressions of hate which can be directed at problematic systems or actions and make
those problems more likely to be fixed. But when expressions of hate rob the targets of more
freedom than is gained in the expression, we, as people, are made less free.
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